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Abstract
This paper reviews recent trends in travel and tourism in the U.S. and Hawaii to ascertain 
how the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and subsequent terrible global events affected their 
tourism flows and the manner and pace of their recovery.  We note that tourism in the 
U.S. has not fully recovered from 9/11 and other international shocks; indeed recovery of 
international travel to the U.S. may be a long way off.  By contrast, Hawaii tourism is 
enjoying robust growth in the aftermath of 9/11 as growth in tourist arrivals from the U.S. 
mainland has more than offset declines in Japanese and other international visitors.  We 
suggest that Hawaii’s current tourism boom is in part explained by the diversion of U.S. 
travel from foreign travel.  The paper demonstrates the usefulness of vector error 
correction models to generate dynamic visitor forecasts, which we use to ascertain 
whether tourism in Hawaii has fully recovered from 9/11 and other terrible international 
events.  The paper considers policy options for facilitating the recovery of international 
tourism to the U.S.  
1    Tourism is an important economic sector in many countries.   It is often described 
as a “fragile” industry in that demand for travel is highly susceptible to numerous shocks 
such as wars, outbreaks of deadly contagious diseases, incidents of terrorism, economic 
fluctuations, currency instability, energy crises, and so on.   When people travel, they do 
not want to be exposed to personal hazards, so safety is a paramount concern of most 
travelers.  Not surprisingly, terrorist incidents and other threats to personal safety—
whether they are natural disasters or deadly contagious diseases—reduce people’s 
propensity to travel. Alternatively, some people may opt to change their travel plans and 
visit destinations where they are exposed to less personal risk.  A number of major events 
have had significant negative impacts on international travel and tourism during the past 
decade, among them, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the coalition 
invasion of Afghanistan (October, 2001), the Bali bombings (October, 2002), the “Perfect 
Storm” of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak and the war in Iraq 
(Spring, 2003), the Madrid train bombings (March, 2004), and more recently the massive, 
destructive tsunami in the Indian Ocean (December, 2004) and the London bombings 
(July, 2005).  These various shocks since 9/11 appear to have exerted different impacts in 
the countries directly affected, in neighboring countries and regions, and in the global 
tourism market (Edmonds and Mak, 2005). Reviewing past trends suggests some 
countries appeared to recover more quickly than others from adverse shocks, and an 
examination of the reasons for this warrants researcher attention, especially if the answers 
provide useful policy prescriptions.  
    There is a substantial and growing body of research on the effects of terrorist 
events on tourism, much of which has considered the effect of 9/11 on tourism flows.  
One early analysis, Enders et al. (1992), estimated ARIMA models of tourism arrivals 
and terrorist incidences in Austria, Greece, and Italy, using data from 1970 to 1990, to 
estimate revenue losses in the tourism industries in these countries.  Pizam and Fleischer 
(2002) examined whether the magnitude or frequency of terrorist incidents had a more 
detrimental effect on tourism through analysis of data on Israel and found more frequent 
incidents have a more lasting  effect that can eventually lead to a complete collapse 
of tourism.  Sloboda (2003) applies ARMAX estimation to study the short-term effects of 
terrorism on tourism flows.   Several other recent papers have examined the impact of 
9/11 on particular segments of the U.S. tourism industry—particularly the airline industry 
(e.g., Ready and Dobie 2003, Lee et al. 2005, Rupp et al. 2005) and have highlighted the 
adverse effects of terrorism and  counter-terrorism measures on tourism industry 
performance.  By contrast, there is paucity of research on the process of tourism recovery 
and when full recovery has been achieved following terrorist attacks and other terrible 
events.  As well, there is paucity of rigorous empirical research on how terrorist attacks 
and other shocks may redirect tourists from riskier to perceived safer destinations.  Thus, 
our paper advances the earlier research in a number of respects.  First, we offer a stylized 
way of examining tourism recovery following terrorist attacks and other external shocks 
and develop an empirical method for testing the recovery of Hawaii tourism in the 
aftermath of 9/11.  Second, our paper calls attention to the tourism diversion effect of 
terrorist incidents and notes that terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism measures 
may influence travelers' choices between domestic and international travel.  
2    In this paper, we review trends in travel in the U.S. and Hawaii since 9/11.   We 
wish to ascertain how the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and subsequent international shocks 
affected their tourism flows and the manner and pace of their recovery.  The paper is 
divided into four sections. The first part presents a stylized picture of industry recovery 
following terrorist incidents and other major negative shocks to tourism.  We offer an 
economic—which is quite different from the definition seen in the conventional travel 
trade literature—definition of tourism “recovery”.  The second section reviews and notes 
the decline in international travel to the U.S. and U.S. travel abroad since 9/11.  We argue 
that the recovery of international travel to the U.S. is not imminent.  We suggest that the 
decline in U.S. travel abroad has been partially offset by the diversion to (i.e. increase in) 
domestic U.S. travel and that Hawaii has been a major beneficiary of this travel 
diversion.   We focus on Hawaii because Hawaii has excellent data on both international 
and domestic tourist arrivals.  Moreover, like much of international travel, Hawaii travel 
is long-distance travel and hence a good substitute for travel abroad.  In part three, we 
employ state-of-the-art econometric modeling to derive estimates of the impact of 9/11 
and subsequent shocks on Hawaii inbound tourism flows that also account for the effect 
of macroeconomic fluctuations in the origin and destination countries that influence 
international tourist travel.  We wish to ascertain to what extent Hawaii—which is widely 
regarded as a “safe” destination—has been able to divert travel from other destinations.  
As we shall demonstrate, the substitution of domestic travel for overseas travel by 
Americans since 9/11 has had a dramatic impact on Hawaii, which has witnessed a sharp 
upturn in U.S. mainland-origin tourist arrivals in recent years.  By comparison, travel and 
tourism in the U.S. as a whole has not done as well.  The final section explores possible 
reasons for the differences observed in travel industry responses and considers the effects 
of anti-terrorist and tourism promotion policies on tourism market recovery and growth. 
 I.  Economic View of Tourism Recovery 
  When travel industry officials speak of recovery from 9/11, the conventional 
practice is to refer to the year 2000 as the point of reference, and to regard recovery as 
having been achieved when tourist arrivals (or spending) returns to pre-attack levels. 
Economists, however, tend to view “recovery” differently. For full recovery to have 
occurred, it is not enough to get back to where you began, it is necessary that you get to 
where you otherwise might have been had the terrorist incident not occurred.  Since the 
latter (i.e. the hypothetical level of tourism flow) may be difficult to estimate, a simpler 
alternative, often employed, is to regard recovery as having been attained when the level 
of economic activity (in this instance, tourist arrivals or expenditures) reaches the level 
obtained by extrapolating the pre-event/shock (e.g. 9/11, SARs) long run trend (see, for 
example, Engerman, 1971 and Blunk et al., 2006). 
 By this definition of “recovery”, the effects of an external shock and subsequent 
recovery begin with the historical growth trend in tourist arrivals (or expenditures) that is 
suddenly interrupted by an external shock such as a major terrorist attack or natural 
disaster. The downturn and recovery process is depicted graphically in Figure 1. The 
shock produces a sharp downward spike in tourist arrivals/expenditures. Following the 
shock, recovery begins almost immediately.  To achieve full recovery, tourist 
arrivals/expenditures must grow at a rate that is faster than the historical growth trend 
3during a “catch-up” period.   At some point, with the higher growth rate, tourist 
arrivals/expenditures reach the level that would have been attained had the event not 
occurred and recovery is complete. Thereafter, growth is envisioned to proceed according 
to the historical trend. In this paper, we employ this stylized framework to examine 
tourism recovery in the U.S. and Hawaii after the sequence of terrible events beginning 
with the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
II.  Travel and Tourism in the U.S. Since 9/11 
The terrorist attacks on 9/11 reverberated around the world, but at the global level 
their impact on aggregate international tourist arrivals was thought to be minor.  Shortly 
after the attacks, the World Tourism Organization (WTO) noted with a degree of 
satisfaction that the number of international tourist arrivals fell by less than 1 percent 
from 696.7 million arrivals in 2000 to 692.7 million in 2001.  This small annual decline, 
however, marked a sharp reversal of the growth trend in international tourist arrivals 
registered in the decade preceding 9/11.  By 2002, international tourist arrivals around the 
world rebounded to 702.6 million, exceeding the 2000 peak (World Tourism 
Organization, 2003).  Of course, experiences in individual countries diverged sharply 
from global trends.  For example, Figure 2 shows that 9/11 and subsequent terrorist 
incidents and other major international shocks produced sharp declines in international 
tourist arrivals in the U.S. The Figure indicates that the U.S. travel and tourism industry 
is far from recovery as the volume of international visitors to the U.S. continues to 
languish well below pre-9/11 peak levels. Moreover, unlike the stylized recovery path 
described in Figure 1, the post-9/11 trend remains below the historical trend.   Thus, full 
recovery is not imminent.  The U.S. share of total international arrivals has fallen to a low 
5.9 percent (down significantly from its recent peak level of 9.4 percent recorded in 
1992) before showing a modest rise (0.1 percent) in 2004. 
One compensation to U.S. tourism related businesses has been the uninterrupted 
rise in the number of domestic person trips since 9/11 (Table 1) compared to a 
discouraging decline in the number of foreign tourists. However, total travel spending 
(after accounting for inflation) fell even among U.S. domestic travelers, and in 2004 
remained below the level of domestic travel spending pre-9/11 (Table 2). The drop in 
travel spending has fallen particularly hard on tourism employment as direct employment 
in tourism fell by nearly 5 percent between 2000 and 2004 (Table 3), as compared with a 
marginal (0.23 percent) decline in total employment in the U.S. over the same period.   
The decline in U.S. domestic travel spending, despite the rising number of 
domestic trips, is likely explained by the change in the mix of travelers.  Both the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 and subsequent shocks, and the U.S. economic recession that began in 
March 2001, have led to reduced business travel budgets and sharply curtailed high 
spending business travel, especially travel to conventions and other meetings. In 2003, 
business travel accounted for 18 percent of total domestic person trips in the U.S., but 31 
percent of total travel spending (Travel Industry Association of America, 2005). 
Advances in telecommunication technology explain part of the decline in business travel; 
today businesses (40 percent of business air travelers in 2004) are relying more heavily 
on improved teleconferencing and the Internet as an alternative to personal travel (Ibid.).
4In response to 9/11 and subsequent shocks, U.S. residents have also curtailed their 
travel abroad, and the number of foreign trips from the U.S. declined continuously from 
60.9 million trips in 2000 to 54.2 million trips in 2003 (World Bank, 2005).  If we 
exclude trips to Mexico and Canada, the number of long distance overseas trips declined 
from 26 million to 24 million.   However, the decline in outbound international travel 
from the U.S. was less than the drop in international visitors to the U.S., which 
contributed to the country’s growing current account deficit with the rest of the world.  
The combination of rising domestic travel and declining U.S. travel to foreign 
destinations suggests that Americans have substituted travel to domestic destinations in 
lieu of foreign travel. This is most clearly illustrated in U.S. travel to Hawaii. Figures 3 
and 4 show that while international (i.e. mostly Japanese
1) visitor arrivals to Hawaii fell 
after 9/11 and have yet to reach pre-9/11 levels
2, domestic arrivals from the U.S. 
mainland have risen by more than enough to compensate for the fall in international 
visitors. The total number of visitor arrivals (domestic and foreign) has surpassed the pre-
9/11 peak attained in 2000.  Figure 5 suggests why U.S. travel to Hawaii is booming: the 
pre-9/11 trend in the ratio of Hawaii to foreign travel was falling meaning that U.S. 
travelers were displaying increasing preference for foreign travel as opposed to travel to 
Hawaii before 9/11. The upward spike in the ratio after 9/11 suggests that 9/11 and 
subsequent shocks abroad suddenly increased U.S. preference for travel to Hawaii, and 
this has had a strong positive effect on the state’s tourism industry.   
III.  Post 9/11 Tourist Arrivals in Hawaii:  An Econometric Analysis 
To evaluate in a more rigorous manner the effects of 9/11 and other terrible global 
events on tourist travel to Hawaii, we develop an econometric model of Hawaii tourism 
using quarterly data from 1980:1 through 2001:2.  The estimated model is then used to 
make out-of-sample forecasts of tourism flows in the post-9/11 period assuming that 9/11 
and other subsequent terrible shocks had not occurred.  We then compare the actual path 
of visitor arrivals in the post-9/11 period against the predicted path and the difference is 
attributed to the effects of the shocks.  Our approach is similar to intervention analysis 
commonly used to measure the impact of major events on tourism (see, for example, 
Enders, Sandler and Parise, 1992, Coshall, 2005, and Pizam and Fleischer, 2002).   
However, intervention analysis is typically conducted using simple ARIMA models that 
do not allow for the effects of variables that may help explain tourism flows (an 
exception to this is Bonham and Gangnes, 1996).  Also, intervention analysis is typically 
used to measure the impact effects of a shock by modeling that shock using dummy 
variables.  In contrast, we focus on the recovery from terrorism and other terrible events 
and define recovery as a return to the path tourism would have followed had the shocks 
not occurred.
Specifically, our Hawaii tourism model is a vector error correction model 
(VECM) which explains the movement of four key endogenous tourism variables: U.S. 
1 Japanese visitors accounted for seventy-four percent of all foreign visitors to Hawaii in 2001. 
2 Edmonds and Mak (2005) provide data which suggest that Japanese may also have substituted 
domestic travel for overseas travel after 9/11. 
5(vus) and Japanese (vjp) visitor arrivals to Hawaii, the Hawaii average daily room rate 
(prm), and the Hawaii average hotel occupancy rate (ocup).
3 These endogenous variables 
are determined by U.S. and Japanese real national income (yrus, and yrjprespectively), the 
U.S. consumer price index (pus), and Japan’s exchange rate adjusted consumer price 
index (pjp).  The Appendix has a brief description of the Hawaii Tourism Model (HTM), 
and Zhou et al. (2005) provides a complete discussion. The idea of error correction 
models was suggested by Sargan (1964) and developed in Hendry and Anderson (1977) 
and Davidson et al. (1978).  Examples of applications in tourism demand forecasting 
include Dritsakis (2004), Kulendran and Witt (2003), and Song et al. (2003).
We calculate out-of-sample dynamic forecasts for the period from the third 
quarter of 2001 (2001:3) through the first quarter of 2005 (2005:1), and treat the forecasts 
as the likely path of tourism growth to Hawaii without the effects of 9/11 and other 
subsequent shocks.
4  This is preferable to using linear trend extrapolation since the year 
2000 was a very strong growth year for Hawaii tourism, and forecast values generated by 
linear extrapolation are likely to overstate the growth of tourist arrivals after 2001.  To 
compute dynamic forecasts, lagged endogenous variables in the HTM take their historical 
values up through 2001:2 and their forecasted values from the model beginning in 
2001:3.  In contrast, we make use of historical data on the external factors yrus, yrjp, cpius,
and pjp over the entire forecast period from 2001:3 to 2005:1.  Therefore, to the extent 
that the 9/11 terrorist attacks and other shocks led to a slow-down in the U.S. or Japanese 
economies, our forecasts will be not be immune to all effects of these terrible shocks and 
likely provide lower bound estimates of tourism declines associated with the tragic 
events. However, our model-based forecasts produce slower growth in tourist arrivals 
than suggested by simple trend extrapolation described in Section II.
Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate the “no 9/11” expected paths for U.S. and Japanese 
visitor arrivals compared with the actual paths. Clearly, because these are dynamic out of 
sample forecasts, they will completely miss the severe drop in visitor arrivals that 
occurred in 2001:3, as well as the subsequent decline in Japanese arrivals in 2003:2 
during the height of the SARS epidemic and the start of the Iraq invasion. In Figure 6, 
actual U.S. visitor arrivals exceeded the dynamic forecasts beginning in late 2003, and 
the gap widens markedly in 2004.  By comparison, in Figure 7, Japanese visitor arrivals 
in Hawaii after 9/11 have yet to reach the levels predicted by the model. 
Table 4 summarizes forecasted and actual U.S. and Japanese visitor arrivals in 
Hawaii from 2001:3 through 2005:1.  Applying the economic definition of “recovery” 
described in Section I, Table 4 clearly demonstrates that U.S. travel to Hawaii had fully 
recovered from the shocks of 9/11 and subsequent terrible events by the end of 2003, 
when the number of U.S. visitor arrivals exceeded the predicted number.  By year-end 
3 This approach closely resembles that of Blunk et al. (2006), which estimates a vector 
autoregression model of demand for U.S. domestic airline travel post-9/11 in order to assess the 
industry’s recovery and long term impacts of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
4 Coshall (2005) briefly describes the use of out of sample forecasts of UK tourism receipts from 
an ARIMA model, and refers to a “speedy recovery” and “return to norm” as  occurring when 
actual receipts approach the level predicted by his model. 
62004, the actual number of U.S. visits to Hawaii was 9 percent higher than the predicted 
number of arrivals in 2004, and in the first quarter of 2005 they were 18.5 percent higher 
than the forecast number.  It is not mere coincidence that U.S. arrivals to Hawaii (and to 
other domestic destinations) grew even as U.S. foreign/overseas travel declined following 
9/11.  We suggest that many U.S. travelers were transparently making conscious choices 
to travel domestically rather than to destinations abroad in a world that was perceived to 
have become increasingly hazardous to U.S. citizens.  It is also noteworthy that there 
were 4.125 million U.S. visitor arrivals in Hawaii in 2000 so that 2003 was also the year 
when U.S. visitor arrivals surpassed the pre-9/11 peak.  By comparison, Table 4 tells a 
totally different story for Japanese travel to Hawaii.  By year-end 2004, the 1.481 million 
Japanese arrivals in Hawaii were 15.8 percent below predicted arrivals and nearly 19 
percent less than the number recorded in 2000 (1.819 million). However, there could be 
reasons other than the fear of foreign travel after 9/11 that helps to explain the decline in 
Japanese visits to the Hawaiian Islands.
5
Table 5 compares the gains and losses in Hawaii real tourism revenues post-9/11 
in year 2000 prices.  These gains and losses were derived by multiplying the differences 
between the actual and forecasted visitor arrivals post-9/11 (Table 4) by the yearly 
estimates of the average per person per trip expenditures for U.S. and Japanese visitors, 
deflated by the Honolulu consumer price index (CPI-U, Year 2000=100).  Again, 
applying the economic definition of recovery, Table 5 shows that tourism receipts from 
U.S. visitors had fully recovered by year-end 2003, but not for Japanese visitors.   
Nevertheless, by 2004, gains in tourism receipts from U.S. visitors more than 
compensated for the losses from Japanese visitors.  Thus, aggregate tourism receipts for 
Hawaii from these two groups of visitors had achieved full recovery (in the economic 
sense) by year-end 2004.  Still, recent gains in tourism revenues were not enough to 
recoup earlier aggregate losses incurred between 2001:3 and 2003:4.  Furthermore, in 
2004, tourism receipts, adjusted for inflation, were nearly 2.5 percent less than the level 
in 2000.  Measured in real dollars, tourism spending by U.S. and Japanese visitors to 
Hawaii has not returned to the pre-9/11 level even though total revenues have fully 
recovered.  An important lesson that can be drawn from this paper regarding the nature of 
recovery from exogenous shocks is that individual expenditures on tourism need not 
necessarily get back to the pre-shock levels of performance in order for tourism revenues 
to achieve full recovery from the shocks themselves.  There could be reasons other than 
the shocks that may explain why we should not expect tourism revenues to return to the 
pre-shock levels.   In Hawaii’s case, real visitor spending per person per trip had been 
declining long before 9/11 (see, for example, Mak and Sakai, 1992, pp. 191-192; and 
DBEDT, 1999-2004) so real tourism receipts might have been expected to decline even if 
9/11 and other shocks had not occurred.
In sum, the story of Hawaii tourism post-9/11 parallels that for the entire U.S with 
international tourist arrivals exhibiting lackluster performance while domestic travel 
appears to have benefited from the greater reluctance of U.S. leisure travelers to venture 
5 Mak, Carlile, and Dai (2005) suggest that the aging of Japan’s population may also help to 
explain the declining number of tourist visitors to Hawaii from Japan. 
7abroad. However, by 2004 tourism in Hawaii had fully recovered from 9/11 and other 
terrible international events after 2001, but this was not the case for the U.S. overall.  
IV.  Conclusions and Policy Implications  
Global tourism has withstood the effects of recent years’ terrible events pretty 
well as travelers appear to have adapted to threats by switching their choices of travel 
destinations. As a result, tourist arrivals in most countries have displayed great resilience 
in the face of the adverse post-9/11 travel environment. Nonetheless, the succession of 
negative shocks around the world during this period has clearly stymied the recovery of 
tourism in some countries. In the case of the U.S., two trends appear to be working 
together to contribute to the decline in its global market share of international tourism.  
One trend relates to the reality and perception regarding ease of travel to the U.S. and the 
hospitality of the country to foreign visitors.  The second trend relates to increasing ease 
of international travel to many countries and the emergence of new destinations for 
international visitors.   
A number of recent large multi-country surveys of public opinion indicate views 
abroad about the U.S. have become increasingly negative (Pew Research Center, 2005, 
Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2006), which may carry over into an 
increasing perception abroad that the U.S. is unfriendly to foreign tourists. However, 
these trends have not been clearly demonstrated to be a serious deterrent to foreign travel 
to the U.S.  The perception that U.S. is ‘fortress-like’ when it comes to allowing foreign 
tourists into the country is longstanding. Among countries of the west, the U.S. has had 
among the most restrictive visa entry requirements. The U.S. implemented its first visa 
waiver agreement with U.K. (as an experiment) only in 1988, and today, the list of 
countries whose nationals are able to enter the U.S. without a prearranged visa is perhaps 
the shortest of any of the OECD countries.   
It seems clear that the growing number of regulations and requirements needed to 
obtain a tourist visa to the U.S. make it more difficult for foreigners who want to visit the 
U.S.   Requirements for personal interviews, and higher visa application fees and longer 
waits to obtain visas can deter would-be international visitors.  Added security measures 
at U.S. Embassies abroad mean that visa applicants must often wait in long-lines in order 
to apply for a visa (See, for example, Edmonds and Mak, 2005, and Luzadder, 2005). 
U.S. insistence that foreign visitors hold passports that include biometric identifiers of the 
passport holder threatened to stifle the busy summer travel season, and was only dropped 
last May when it became clear that a majority of European countries would not be able to 
satisfy the requirement.
6
While added scrutiny of would-be visitors and tighter security at U.S. facilities 
abroad are entirely understandable post-9/11, greater efforts seem necessary to ensure the 
6 By October 27, 2005, two of the 27 countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program—Italy 
and France—were unable to meet the October 26
th deadline to produce passports with integrated 
circuit chips capable of storing biographic information from the passport data page, a digitized 
photograph, and other biometric information (Milligan, 2005). 
8that time and inconvenience faced by those interested in visiting the U.S. be reduced as 
much as possible.  There is a widespread perception among tourism and travel industry 
representatives that tourism has often been treated as a “second class citizen” among the 
other major industries. Unless this mindset changes, final recovery of international travel 
to the U.S. is unlikely. The industry, however, is not totally impotent. The recent 
announcement by the 2,200-member Travel Industry Association of America (TIA) to 
forge a “strategic partnership” with the Travel Business Roundtable (TBR) could help to 
elevate policymaker concern about the impact of border control policies on international 
travel to the U.S. and offers promise of providing a coordinated campaign to promote the 
adoption of policies that reduce many of the pains associated with international travel. 
There is an obvious need for the U.S. to figure out ways to reduce the transactions costs 
foreign tourists face in their efforts to visit the U.S.  Otherwise, international travel to the 
U.S. seems likely to continue to perform below its potential, and the country will be 
economically worse off as a result. Encouragingly, the U.S. Department of State and the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security recently (January 2006) unveiled a joint strategy 
termed “Secure Borders, Open Door” to encourage inbound tourism to the U.S. 
(Milligan, 2006; Hall, 2006).
Another trend—i.e. measures taken by foreign countries to ease their inbound 
travel restrictions in order to promote international travel to their countries—also appears 
likely to contribute to the relative decline in U.S. international tourism.   Following 9/11, 
many countries have actually lowered their regulatory barriers to international visitors 
and made it easier for foreign visitors to visit.  Perhaps it is not a coincidence that 
Singapore, which has visa waiver agreements with well over 150 countries in the world, 
saw its international travel quickly recover from waves of external shocks and surpass its 
pre-9/11 peak (Edmonds and Mak, 2005).  The numbers of foreign travelers visiting 
China have been increasing and if recent trends continue the country will likely pass the 
U.S. as the third most popular international destination worldwide.  In recent years, China 
has quickly negotiated and implemented “Approved Destination Status” (ADS) 
agreements that facilitate easier visa processes for Chinese wishing to travel abroad and 
for foreigners wishing to visit China.
The period since the 1990’s has seen a number of important multilateral 
agreements to ease travel between countries. The European Union (EU) implemented the 
“Schengen Visa” that enables foreign visitors from non-EU countries to obtain a single 
visa that allows them to travel to all the EU countries.  Several countries in the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) now allow visa free entry for each 
other’s nationals, and negotiations are underway to allow a “Schengen-type” visa for 
travel within the ASEAN region.  These developments are mentioned to note that moves 
toward easing travel restrictions continue around the world, even in an environment of 
heightened security concerns, and to note that in the highly competitive global market for 
tourism, these measures can be expected to influence travelers’ choices of destinations.  
For the U.S., 9/11 and its heightened security measures in executing the war on global 
terrorism has had the unfortunate side-effect of harming international travel to the 
country—perhaps for a long time to come. 
9On a positive front, the preference for travel to Hawaii (and perhaps other 
domestic destination) as a substitute for foreign travel may increase further in the near 
future as new U.S. travel regulations under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 
(WHTI) that will require U.S. residents returning from trips to Mexico, Canada, and the 
Caribbean (except Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands) to show U.S. passports will 
likely further discourage American travel abroad.
7  There is a caveat here, however, 
because once U.S. travelers begin to favor foreign travel again, the current boom in 
Hawaii tourism could come to an end. For now, it is clear that tourism enterprises in the 
U.S. and Hawaii have become more dependent on domestic leisure travel.  
7 By law, the WHTI must be fully implemented by January 1, 2008.  However, the State 
Department and the Department of Homeland Security recently announced a plan to create an 
identity card to facilitate travel across U.S. borders (Milligan, 2006). 
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The Hawaii tourism model (HTM) is a four variable vector error correction model 
(VECM).   A VECM, is basically a vector autoregression model in differences 
augmented by levels information in the form of “equilibrium errors”.  The equilibrium 
errors arise from imposing cointegration restrictions.  For example, suppose that U.S. 
visitor arrivals to Hawaii (vus) and U.S. real income (yrus) are nonstationary, I(1) series. 
(A series is I(d), i.e., integrated of order d, if it must be differenced d times to be made 
stationary.)  Nonstationary processes may wander a great distance from their starting 
point and are not tied to any fixed mean.  Yet a linear combination,vus J  yrus  HDus, may 
exist that is I(0) and therefore defines an equilibrium relationship.  The linear 
combination defines an attractor that prevents the two I(1) series from wandering too far 
apart.     Finally, when two or more series are cointegrated they are known to have an 
error correction representation,
(A.1) 'vus,t   c0  Ei i 0
p ¦ 'yrus,ti  E j j 1
k ¦ 'vus,t j D HDus  Pt.
In equation (1), the change in U.S. visitors is explained by past changes in itself, 
changes in real income, and the “equilbrium error”, HDus, defined by deviations from the 
cointegrating relationship.   An important advantage of error correction models is that 
they provide a method of combining the benefits of modeling both levels and differences, 
and the parameter, D, on the “equilibrium error” provides a measure of how much of the 
“disequilibrium” is corrected in each period.  The VECM simply extends these concepts 
to the case of a vector of variables.  
The HTM explains the movements of four endogenous variables: U.S. visitor 
arrivals, vus, Japan visitor arrivals, vjp, the Hawaii average daily room rate, prm, and the 
Hawaii average hotel occupancy rate, ocup, conditional on a set of weakly exogenous 
external factors (see Zhou, Bonham and Gangnes, 2005). The external factors are U.S. 
and Japanese real national income (yrus, and yrjp respectively), U.S. consumer prices 
(cpius), and Japanese exchange rate adjusted consumer prices (pjp).
8
The HTM was developed by ﬁrst estimating an eight variable VAR, testing and 
imposing weak exogeneity restrictions on the external drivers, and testing and imposing 
cointegration restrictions. Finding evidence of three cointegrating relationships, 
restrictions were tested and imposed to identify equilibrium visitor demand equations for 
both the U.S. and Japan, and one inverted supply curve explaining the hotel room price. 
The identiﬁed equilibrium relations are:  
(A.2) vus   0.167(prmcpius) 2.5 yrus 0.012 t HDus
(A.3) v jp   0.336(prm p jp) 2.25 yrjp HDjp
(A.4) prm   0.572vus  0.116v jp 1.76ocup 0.008 t HS
                                                
8 All variables used throughout Part III of the text are described in Table A1.2. All series used in 
this part of the paper are also seasonally adjusted at quarterly frequency and expressed as natural 
logarithms with the exception of the occupancy rate expressed as a percentage. 
14The VECM then models the growth of the endogenous variables conditional upon 
the growth of weakly exogenous variables and the equilibrium errors HDus,HDjp, and HS.
(A.5) 'yt   c0 Z'xt * i i 1
3 ¦ 'zti D1HDus D2HDjp D3HS  Pt
where z  [y,x c ] ,  y  [vus,v jp,prm,ocup c ] , x  [yrus,yrjp,cpius,p jp c ] . The 31 loading 
vectors D1, D2, andD3 determine the extent to which demand and supply variables 
respond to disequilibrium.  For example, if U.S. arrivals are less than predicted by U.S. 
real income.  
Table A1: Dynamic Model: Loading Parameters and Diagnostic 
Equation Į1 Į2 Į3 R
2 AR1-5 Normality Arch
'vus -0.2014 0.1642 0.6378 2.5094 0.6526      0.64 
(-5.148) (4.725) [0.0526] [0.7216] [0.6413]
'v jp -0.2932 0.7345 2.2675 1.9872      0.46 
(-3.932) [0.0741] [0.3702] [0.7632]
'prm -0.1147 -0.1617 0.7359 2.0703 3.0002      0.51 
(-5.186) (-4.507) [0.0981] [0.2231] [0.7266]
'ocup -0.0503 -0.1265 0.2137 0.7531 2.1744 0.0710      0.43 




(71) =  46.4704 [0.9893] 
Note: Column 1 lists the dependent variable of individual equations in the system; Columns 2 to 4 
give the loading parameters, ǩ1гǩ3 and the corresponding Student t-statistic for the three identiﬁed 
cointegrating vectors; Column 5 presents the coeffcient of determination R
2
; Column 6 gives an F-test 
(and corresponding p-value) for the null hypothesis that the equation residuals are independent up to 
lag 5. Column 7 is a ǿ
2
test (and p-value) for the null hypothesis that the regression residuals are 
normally distributed. Column 8 is a test for the null that the residuals do not exhibit autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH). Figures in parenthesis (.) are the Student t-statistics 
corresponding to the loading parameters whereas those in brackets [.] are p-values for individual tests. 
Computations are carried out using Pc-Fiml 9.10 with the exception of the R
2
which are calculated 
using RATS v 5.0. 
The three long-run equilibrium errors enter the four equations differently. The 
equation for U.S. visitor growth, 'vus, contains both HDus and HS. The loading parameter 
on the U.S. demand equilibrium, HDus, is -0.20, so 20% of the equilibrium error is 
corrected each period. The equation for Japanese visitor growth, 'v jp, contains only the 
equilibrium error associated with Japanese visitor demand, HDjp, with a coefficient of -.29, 
suggesting complete adjustment to any disequilibrium in less than a years time. The 
equilibrium errors for U.S. demand, HDus, and the supply relationship, HS, enter the hotel 
room price equation, 'prm, while all three errors enter the equation for the change in 
hotel occupancy, ' .  The estimated system appears to be an adequate model for 
Hawaii tourism activity. All equations perform reasonably well, explaining 64%, 73%, 
ocup
1574%, and 75% of the variation in 'vus, 'v jp, 'prm, and 'ocup, respectively. All 
equations pass all diagnostic tests at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
Table A2: Summary of Variables in the Hawaii Tourism Model 
Mnemonic   Description Units Source
Hawaii Variables
vus U.S. visitors to Hawaii 000s DBEDT;
v jp Japanese visitors to Hawaii 000s DBEDT;
prm Hawaii average daily hotel room rate   dollar DBEDT
ocup Hawaii average daily hotel occupancy rate   % DBEDT
U.S. Variables
yrus U.S. real personal income   bil 82-84$ BEA
cpius U.S. CPI (1982-1984=100) index BLS
Japan Variables
yrjp Japan real personal income   bil 95Yen ESRI
cpijp Japan CPI (1995=100) index SBSC
e yen/dollar exchange rate yen/dollar FED
Calculated Variables
p jp cpi jp /e - Authors’ calc.
Abreviations: 
DBEDT: Department of Business Economic Development and Tourism, State of Hawaii. 
BEA: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
BLS: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. 
FED: Federal Reserve Bank at St. Louis. 
ESRI: Economic and Social Research Institute, Japan. 
SBSC: Statistics Bureau and Statistics Center, Japan.  
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Table 1. Domestic and Foreign Travel in the U.S.: 2000-2004 
    Domestic Person Trips  Foreign Visitors   
Year       (millions)     (millions) 
2000    1,100.8       51.2 
2001      1,123.1 (2.03)    46.9 (-8.40) 
2002      1,127.0 (0.35)    43.5 (-7.25) 
2003      1,140.0 (1.15)    41.2 (-5.29) 
2004      1,163.9 (2.10)    46.1 (11.89) 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis gives the year-on-year change (pct.) 
Source: Travel Industry Association of America (TIA) (2005) 
Table 2. Domestic and Foreign Travel Spending in the US: 2000-04 
  In Current US$ (billions)     In Year 2000 $ (billions)
Year   Domestic  Foreign   Total   Domestic   Foreign Total
2000    $498.4   $82.4  $580.8   $498.4   $82.4  $580.8   
2001       479.0     71.9    550.9     473.8    71.1    544.9 
2002      473.6     66.5    540.1     470.7    66.0    536.7 
2003      491.6     65.1    556.7     475.9    63.0    538.9 
2004      525.3     74.8     600.1     486.8    69.3     556.1 
Percentage Change 2000 to 2004      -2.3%  -15.9%     -4.3% 
Note: Real expenditures were calculated using the travel price index developed by the 
Travel Industry Association of America. 
Source: Spending data from the TIA (2005).
Table 3. Direct Tourism Related Sales and Tourism Employment in the US: 2000-04 
   Nominal Direct  Deflated Direct Tourism       
   Tourism Sales   Sales (in billions Yr.2000$)  Direct Employment 
Year    (billions current $)  TIA Deflator   CPI-U     ( in 000s) 
2000   $516.7  $516.7  $516.7      5,698.3 
2001      492.1    486.7    478.2     5,624.3 
2002      494.1    490.7    472.8     5,499.5 
2003      512.2    495.8    479.1     5,402.1 
2004      546.4    506.4    497.6      5,423.6 
Pct. Change 
2000-Low Year        -4.8%       -5.8%       -8.5%          -5.2%   
2000-2004         5.7%       -2.0%       -3.7%              -4.8% 
Sources: Direct sales and employment data from Bureau of Economic Analysis (2005); travel 
price index used to deflate direct sales obtained from the Travel Industry Association of America 
(TIA); CPI-U obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2005). 2
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